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CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

CPLR 305(b): Summons accompanied by neither complaint nor
305(b) notice constitutes jurisdictional defect that can deprive
plaintiff of extension under CPLR 205(a)

Under New York law an action may be commenced and personal jurisdiction acquired by the service of a summons upon a defendant.' Section 305(b) of the CPLR makes it clear that a summons served without a complaint is effective provided it contains a
notice that specifies the nature of the action and the relief sought.2
I CPLR 304 (1972); see Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 414-15, 140 N.E. 938, 939
(1923); Copper v. Prokos, 51 Misc. 2d 757, 758, 273 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1966); see also SIEGEL §§ 59-60, at 61; 1 WK&M T 301.04, at 3-11 (1984); Farell,
Civil Practice, 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 92 (1982) (service of summons commences action).
See generally Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and JurisdictionalMotions in New York,
14 BUFFALO L. REV. 374, 393-95 (1964-1965) (discussion of history of service of summons
without complaint). Section 304 of the CPLR "states the fundamental rule that no action
...is commenced until jurisdiction is acquired." CPLR 304, commentary at 162 (1972); see
McMullen v. Arone, 79 App. Div. 2d 496, 499, 437 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (2d Dep't 1981). The
purpose of a summons is to notify the defendant that a judgment is being sought against
him and to afford him the opportunity to take any steps necessary to protect his rights and
interests. Stuyvesant v. Weil, 167 N.Y. 421, 425, 60 N.E. 738, 739 (1901); Connell v. Hayden,
83 App. Div. 2d 30, 35-36, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383, 389 (2d Dep't 1981). Giving such notice is a
fundamental requirement of the Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment. See Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Connell, 83 App. Div. 2d at
36, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 389; see also SIEGEL §§ 58-59, at 59-60 (other requirements, opportunity
to be heard and jurisdictional basis). For a further discussion of the relationship between
the service of a summons and due process, see infra note 43 & text accompanying notes 4243.
2 CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Section 305(b) provides:
If the complaint is not served with the summons, the summons shall contain
or have attached thereto a notice stating the nature of the action and the relief
sought, and, except in an action for medical malpractice, the sum of money for
which judgment may be taken in case of default.
Id.
The 1963 version of 305(b) provided that for default judgment purposes a summons
could be served without a complaint if the claim was for a sum certain and a notice stating
that sum accompanied the summons. CPLR 305(b) (1963) (current version as amended at
CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)); see The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 125, 138 (1965); infra notes 25-27 & accompanying text. This version of 305(b) was
amended in 1965, see ch. 749, § 1, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1783, to provide a plaintiff with the
opportunity to secure a default judgment for unliquidated damages without serving a complaint, provided the summons was accompanied with an object notice. See CPLR 305(b)
(1972); id., commentary at 177; see also 1 WK&M 1 305.12, at 3-171 (1984); McLaughlin,
Civil Practice, 17 SYRACUSE L. REv. 331, 334-35 (1965); infra notes 32-34 & accompanying
text. It was noted at the time of the amendment that the change was compelled by the
requirements of the default mechanism. See, e.g., CPLR 305, commentary at 177 (1972);
McLaughlin, supra, at 334-35. For a further discussion on this version of 305(b), see infra
notes 28-33 & accompanying text. The current version of 305(b) was enacted in 1978, see ch.
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Nevertheless, it was unclear whether a summons served with
neither a complaint nor a 305(b) notice was effective.3 Recently,
528, § 1, [1978] N.Y. Laws, in an attempt to remove the snare that the prior version had
created, see CPLR 305, commentary at 132 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); id. 3012, commentary at 123; FIFTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1977), in TWENTYTHIRD ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 273 (1978). The difficulty with the 1965 amendment arose because of the permissive language contained in the statute itself, see CPLR
305(b) (1972), and the mandatory dictates of CPLR 3215(e), see CPLR 3215(e) (1970) (current version as amended at CPLR 3215(e) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)). For a more complete discussion, see infra notes 34-36 & accompanying text.
3 An examination of existing New York case law reveals the confusion surrounding the
validity of service of a bare summons. One view espouses that service of a bare summons
will be ineffective solely for purposes of default proceedings, see, e.g., Nuez v. Diaz, 101
Misc. 2d 399, 401, 421 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1979); Schoonmaker v.
Ford Motor Co., 99 Misc. 2d. 1095, 1095, 418 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County
1979), aff'd, 79 App. Div. 2d 1067, 435 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep't 1981), while the other takes
the position that such a summons is a jurisdictional defect that fails to commence an action,
see, e.g., Ciaschi v. Town of Enfield, 86 App. Div. 2d 903, 904, 448 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (3d
Dep't 1982); Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d 525, 526, 419 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1979) (failure to comply with 305(b) a jurisdictional defect); see also Premo v. Cornell, 71 App. Div. 2d 223, 224, 423 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65 (3d Dep't 1979) (dictum). But see Wagenknecht v. LoRusso, 121 Misc. 2d 45, 46, 467 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1983) (defective 305(b) notice constitutes mere irregularity and does not divest court of jurisdiction over defendant).
In Nuez, the defendant made a motion to vacate a default judgment claiming that the
court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment since the summons served by the plaintiff
failed to recite in sufficient detail the nature of the action and the amount of relief requested. 101 Misc. 2d at 401, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 771. The court held that "the failure to set
forth a specific amount requested as damages is jurisdictional and precludes the entry of
default judgment." Id. (emphasis added). In Schoonmaker, the 305(b) notice sent by the
plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory standards prescribed for such notice, 99 Misc.
2d at 1095, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 289, hence, the defendant contended that such a failure required a jurisdictional dismissal of the action, id. at 1096, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 289. The court
held that since the summons itself was proper, it was ineffective only for the purpose of
entering a default judgment, and since no default had occurred, the bare summons properly
commenced the action. Id.
In Ciaschi, the plaintiff tried to commence an action by the service of a summons without the required 305(b) notice. 86 App. Div. 2d at 903, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 269. The court held
that the lack of notice was a jurisdictional defect rendering the summons insufficient both to
obtain jurisdiction over the defendant and to commence the action. Id. at 904, 448 N.Y.S.2d
at 269. The plaintiff in Premo served a summons with a notice that stated the nature of the
plaintiff's action, but failed to state the amount to be recovered in case of default. 71 App.
Div. 2d at 223, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 65. The court, although holding that the lack of the ad
damnum was merely an irregularity that could be amended, id. at 224-25, 423 N.Y.S.2d at
65, stated, in dicta, that absent the 305(b) notice, the summons is jurisdictionally void, id. at
224, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 65. The Premo dicta was adopted in Wilson v. Metropolitan Property
Liab. Ins. Co., 114 Misc. 2d 992, 453 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1982), in which
the court held that when a summons is missing all three elements of the mandated 305(b)
notice, it is jurisdictionally void, leaving a court without jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.
at 994-95, 453 N.Y.S.2d 882 at 140.
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however, in Parker v. Mack,4 the Court of Appeals held that the
service of a "bare summons" constituted a jurisdictional defect
that prevented the commencement of an action 5 and, therefore,
precluded the availability of the 6-month extension provided by
CPLR section 205(a).
In Parker,the plaintiff wife was injured when her car collided
with the defendant's automobile. One day before the statute of
limitations was to expire, two summonses unaccompanied by complaints were served on the defendant.8 Neither summons, however,
contained, nor had attached thereto, the required 305(b) notice.'
Thereafter, complaints were forwarded to the defendant's attorneys, who returned them and moved to dismiss on the ground that
the summonses were jurisdictionally defective. 10 Rather than oppose the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs cross-moved for an additional 6 months in which to recommence the action pursuant to
CPLR 205(a)." Special term granted both defendant's motion to
dismiss and plaintiffs' 205(a) extension request.'2 The Appellate
- 61

N.Y.2d 114, 460 N.E.2d 1316, 472 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1984).
5 Id. at 115, 460 N.E.2d at 1316, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
- Id. at 115-16, 460 N.E.2d at 1316, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882; see CPLR 205(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1983-1984). Section 205(a) provides in pertinent part:
If an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by
a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute
the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff. . . may commence a
new action upon the same transaction ... within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time
of commencement of the prior action.
Id. For a plaintiff to be able to invoke this provision, a prior action must have been commenced. See infra notes 39-41 & accompanying text. For a complete discussion of 205(a),
see infra notes 37-44 & accompanying text.
61 N.Y.2d at 120, 460 N.E.2d at 1319, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 116, 460 N.E.2d at 1316, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882. The first summons served upon
the defendant was for an action by Mrs. Parker, the second for an action by her husband.
Id. at 120, 460 N.E.2d at 1319, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
9 Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). Each summons set forth the name and address of the
plaintiff together with the name, address, and telephone number of the plaintiffs' attorney.
Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). The summonses called upon the defendant to serve a notice of
appearance within 20 days or a judgment by default would be taken against him for the
relief demanded in the complaint. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
o Id. at 116, 460 N.E.2d at 1316, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
" Id. at 116, 460 N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882-83. The reason the plaintiffs
cross-moved for the inclusion of a 205(a) provision was because the statute of limitations on
the negligence action already had expired. Id.
12 Id.
at 116, 460 N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883. Special term concluded that a
summons served without the 305(b) mandated notice was not a jurisdictional defect and
therefore did not prevent the actions from being commenced. Id.
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Division, Third Department, modified the special term decision by
reversing that part of the order granting plaintiffs' 205(a) cross3
motion.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that no action can be commenced by the service of a bare summons. 14 The
majority'6 reaffirmed a prior holding of the Court' and asserted
that the imperative language of 305(b) mandates that to commence
7
an action, a summons must contain at least a 305(b) notice.'
Judge Jones therefore concluded that the plaintiff was precluded
from invoking the benefits of 205(a) since, due to the defective service, the earlier action had not been timely commenced.' 8
Dissenting, Judge Meyer contended that the majority's holding, based upon a one word change in 305(b) effected by a 1978
amendment,' evidenced a complete disregard of the legislative
" Id. at 116-17, 460 N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883. The Appellate Division,
Third Department, held that the service of a bare summons neither conferred jurisdiction
over the defendant nor constituted the timely commencement of an action. Id. at 117, 460
N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
14Id. at 115, 119, 460 N.E.2d 1316, 1318, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882, 884.
" Judge Jones wrote the opinion of the Court in which Chief Judge Cooke and Judges
Wachtler and Kaye concurred. Judge Meyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judge
Jasen concurred. Judge Simons took no part in the decision.
,661 N.Y.S.2d at 117, 460 N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883; see Markoff v. South
Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 286, 288, 461 N.E.2d 1253, 1254-55, 473 N.Y.S.2d
766, 767-68 (1984). In Markoff, the Court of Appeals held that when an action is dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction because the summons was either defective or never served,
205(a) will be unavailable because the action never was commenced within the meaning of
205(a). 61 N.Y.2d at 288, 461 N.E.2d at 1254-55, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68. The Court premised its holding in Markoff on the fact that "fa]n action will not be deemed 'commenced,'
... until there has been proper service of a summons upon a defendant in compliance with
the appropriate method prescribed by the CPLR." Id. at 286, 461 N.E.2d at 1254, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 767; see Parker,61 N.Y.2d at 117, 460 N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883. In
so holding, the Markoff Court noted that it was not creating a new exception to 205(a), but
was merely recognizing that a timely commenced action is a condition precedent to the use
of 205(a). Markoff, 61 N.Y.2d at 288, 461 N.E.2d at 1255, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 768; see infra
notes 39-40 & accompanying text.
" 61 N.Y.2d at 117, 460 N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
18 Id. at 115-17, 460 N.E.2d at 1316-17, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882-83.
The Court also reasoned that the legislative intent behind the amendment of 305(b)
was to acknowledge a defendant's right to information concerning the claim being asserted
against him. Id. at 117-18, 460 N.E.2d at 1317, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883. The majority noted that
requiring the plaintiff to give a 305(b) notice along with the summons would impose no
burden or hardship. Id. In rebuttal to the assertion in the dissent that a bare summons
would be a jurisdictional defect solely for the purposes of default judgments, Judge Jones
stated that if the legislature intended such an effect it would have provided for it in the
statute expressly. Id. at 118, 460 N.E.2d at 1317-18, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883-84.
" Compare CPLR 305(b) (1972) (summons "may" contain) with CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (summons "shall" contain).
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history of the amendment.20 Judge Meyer asserted that the legislative history of the 1978 amendment indicates that it was adopted
to alleviate the confusion surrounding default judgments and to establish that deviations from the 305(b) notice requirements would
constitute jurisdictional defects only for purposes of default proceedings.2 1 The dissent, moreover, asserted that the broad, remedial, and liberal purpose of the tolling provision of 205(a) precludes a narrow construction of that section.2 2 Judge Meyer also
noted that the majority's holding was incompatible with CPLR 304
and 305(c) because the court, in its discretion, is empowered to
allow an amendment of a summons.23 Lastly, the dissent asserted
that the majority's holding was contrary to the express directive of
the CPLR that it is to be liberally construed.2 4
It is submitted that the Court's interpretation of 305(b) as a
jurisdictional requirement to the commencement of an action is inconsistent with the true purpose of the statute, which is to ensure
compliance with default procedure.
61 N.Y.2d at 119, 460 N.E.2d at 1318, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 121-23, 460 N.E.2d at 1320-21, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 886-87 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the historical development of and the intent behind 305(b), see infra
notes 25-36 & accompanying text.
22 61 N.Y.2d at 123-25, 460 N.E.2d at 1321-22, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The dissent, quoting Judge Cardozo, stated:
The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in
court till he reaches a judgment on the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not
to be frittered away by any narrow construction. The important consideration is
that by invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a
present purpose to maintain his rights before the courts.
Id. at 123-24, 460 N.E.2d at 1321, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 887 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 539, 109 N.E. 594, 596 (1915)) (emphasis
omitted).
23 61 N.Y.2d at 126-27, 460 N.E.2d at 1322-23, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Meyer, after noting that an action is commenced and jurisdiction acquired
by service of a summons, id. at 126, 460 N.E.2d at 1323, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 1 & accompanying text, suggested that to classify a bare summons as no summons "is to ignore the fact that '[t]he object of the summons is to apprise
the. . . defendant that the plaintiff. . . seeks a judgment against him so that he may take
such steps as may seem advisable to protect his interests . . . ' 61 N.Y.2d at 126, 460
N.E.2d at 1323, 472 N.Y.S. at 888 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Stuyvesant v. Weil, 167
N.Y. 421, 425, 60 N.E. 738, 739 (1901)); see supra note 1. Judge Meyer also noted that
under the terms of CPLR 305(c) courts are granted broad discretion to allow an amendment
to the summons, which, he asserted, indicates a legislative intent for a liberal rather than a
restrictive reading of that subdivision. 61 N.Y.2d at 126-27, 460 N.E.2d at 1323, 472
N.Y.S.2d at 889 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
2 61 N.Y.2d at 128-29, 460 N.E.2d at 1324, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (Meyer, J., dissenting);
see, e.g., CPLR 104 (1972).
2"
21
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In its 1963 form,2 5 305(b) enabled a plaintiff to obtain a default judgment for a sum certain without service of a complaint
provided the summons was accompanied by a default notice.2 6 The
default notice was essential because the absence of both a complaint and a default notice precluded the entry of a default judgment.2 7 305(b) was amended in 196528 solely to provide a plaintiff
who claimed unliquidated damages the opportunity to secure a default judgment.29 The amended statute would permit the entry of a
25 CPLR 305(b) (1963) (current version as amended at CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp.
1983-1984)). In 1963, CPLR 305(b) provided:
If the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, and the complaint is not served with the summons, the
plaintiff may serve with the summons, a notice stating the sum of money for
which judgment will be taken in case of default.
Id.
26 Id.; see Everitt v. Everitt, 4 N.Y.2d 13, 16, 148 N.E.2d 891, 893, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836,
838 (1958); CPLR 305, commentary at 177 (1972); CPLR 305, commentary at 454 (1963);
see also The Biannual Survey, supra note 2, at 138 (discussion of 1965 amendment of
305(b)). The 1963 version of 305(b) differed from pre-CPLR versions in that default notices
could be used in any action involving a sum certain and were not limited only to contract
actions. See CPLR 305, commentary at 454 (1963). The primary value of the default notice
was that it enabled the plaintiff to enter a default judgment with the clerk of the court
without application to the court. Id.; CPLR 305, commentary at 177 (1972).
27 CPLR 3215(e) (1970); see Malone v. Citarella, 7 App. Div. 2d 871, 871, 182 N.Y.S.2d
200, 201 (2d Dep't 1959). CPLR 3215(e) provides in pertinent part:
On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice served pursuant
to subdivision (b) of rule 305 ....
CPLR 3215(e) (1970 & Supp. 1983-1984). This section prohibits the entry of a default judgment when the summons is unaccompanied by a complaint or a 305(b) notice. See Mantell
v. Servidone Constr. Corp., 61 App. Div. 2d 1071, 1071, 403 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (3d Dep't
1978); CPLR 305, commentary at 177 (1972); CPLR 3012, commentary at 123 (McKinney
Supp. 1984-1984); see also McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 334-35 (originally 305(b) did not
address whether a default judgment could be entered on a naked summons). A default judgment entered without a 305(b) notice was considered a nullity and void for any purpose. See
Malone, 7 App. Div. 2d at 871, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
28 Ch. 749, § 1, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1783-84 (CPLR 305(b) prior to 1978 amendment).
The version of 305(b) as amended in 1965 provided:
If the complaint is not served with the summons, the summons may contain or
have attached thereto a notice stating the object of the action and the relief
sought, and, in an action for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation
be made certain, the sum of money for which judgment will be taken
in case of default.
CPLR 305(b) (1972) (current version as amended at CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-

1984)).
29See CPLR 305(b), commentary at 177 (1972); 1 WK&M
305.12, at 3-171 (1984);
McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 334-35. Under the pre-1965 version of 305(b), there was no
opportunity for the plaintiff to enter a default judgment when no complaint was served with
the summons and a default notice was unavailable because the damages were not computa-
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default judgment provided the plaintiff served an "object notice 30
along with the summons.3 1 Notwithstanding the permissive "may"
language of the 1965 amendment, 2 it generally was believed that
inclusion of an object notice with a summons was necessary to preserve the right to a default judgment.3 3 In an effort to remove the
confusion resulting from the permissive language of the statute, 4
ble. See CPLR 305(b), commentary at 177 (1972); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 335. As one
commentator noted, "[p]rior to the 1965 amendment. . . it was apparently impossible for a
plaintiff who had commenced his action by service of a summons alone to enter a default
judgment. . . certainly an anomaly when a plaintiff was supposedly entitled to commence
an action by serving a summons alone." CPLR 305, commentary at 177 (1972). The
amended version afforded a plaintiff in any action the opportunity to secure a default judgment by the service of a summons and an object notice. See id. 305(b); 1 WK&M 305.12,
at 3-171 (1984).
30 See CPLR 305, commentary at 177 (1972). An object notice consists of a general
statement concerning the subject matter of the action and the relief sought. Id. A default
notice, on the other hand, is limited to actions for a sum certain and states the actual
amount that the plaintiff would take if the defendant defaulted. Id. The most significant
distinction between default and object notices is that the latter do not permit the entry of
default with the clerk; a formal application to the court has to be made, and an inquest
must be conducted. Id.; see supra note 26.
31 See 1 WK&M T 305.12, at 3-171 (1984); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 335. The failure of the plaintiff to include an object notice with the service of the summons would leave
the court without jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. See, e.g., A.J. Eckert Co. v.
George A. Fuller Co., 51 App. Div. 2d 844, 844-45, 380 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (3d Dep't 1976);
Arden v. Loew's Hotels, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 894, 894-95, 337 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (3d Dep't
1972); McDermott v. Hoenig, 32 App. Div. 2d 838, 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (2d Dep't
1969).
In McDermott, the defendant moved to vacate a default judgment on the ground that
neither a complaint nor a 305(b) notice had been served with the summons. See 32 App.
Div. 2d at 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 281. The court held that the default judgment was a nullity
since the clerk was without authority to enter the judgment absent proof of service of the
summons and either the complaint or a 305(b) notice. Id. The court also stated that, except
for the jurisdictional defect, the judgment would have been upheld. Id. at 838-39, 302
N.Y.S.2d at 281. In Eckert, the object notice served failed to set forth the relief sought and
therefore was not in compliance with 305(b). 51 App. Div. 2d at 844, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
The court, in affirming an order vacating a default judgment taken by the plaintiff, stated
that the 305(b) requirement is jurisdictional and precludes entry of the default. Id. at 84445, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
32 See CPLR 305(b) (1972); supra note 28.
31See CPLR 305, commentary at 177 (1972); 1 WK&M 305.12, at 3-172 (1984).
" See CPLR 305, commentary at 132 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); id. 3012, commentary at 123; FIFTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1977), in TWENTYTHIRD ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 273, 275 (1978). The current version of 305(b) differs significantly in two ways from its predecessor. The first difference is the change in the
language from "may" to "shall". Compare CPLR 305(b) (1972) (summons "may" contain
requisite notice) with CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (summons "shall" contain
requisite notice). The intent and purpose behind this change was to remove the trap laid by
the permissive language of the prior version. See CPLR 3012, commentary at 123 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); FIFTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1977),
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305(b) was again amended by simply adopting the "mandatory"
aspect of serving notice. 5 As throughout the history of 305(b), the
dictates of default procedure continue to mandate that entry of a
default judgment cannot be maintained without the service of either a complaint or a 305(b) notice.3 6 Based on the historical purpose and development of 305(b), it is suggested that the language
contained in the rule is addressed solely to default proceedings and
that service of a bare summons is not a jurisdictional defect that
precludes the commencement of an action.
It is submitted that the court, by concluding that the service
of a bare summons precludes invocation of the 6-month extension
provided by 205(a), 7 has created an unnecessary restraint upon a
plaintiff's right to benefit from 205(a). Section 205(a) affords a
in TWENTY-THIRD ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 273 (1978). The trap was created by the

mandate of CPLR 3215(e), which governs default judgments. See CPLR 3215(e) (McKinney
Supp. 1983-1984); supra note 27 & accompanying text; infra note 36 & accompanying text.
The amendment of 305(b) finally made it clear that no default judgment could be entered
by the service of a summons unaccompanied by either a complaint or a 305(b) notice. See
CPLR 305, commentary at 132 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); id. 3012, commentary at 123.
Part of the rationale for the amendment of the statute was that, under the prior version, a
defendant could "stymie" the plaintiff by doing nothing if the summons was served without
the 305(b) notice. Id. 3012, commentary at 123. With the mandatory language of the current
version, the requisite for the entry of a default judgment under § 3215(e) will be satisfied.
Id. As the court noted in Bal v. Court Employment Project, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d 69, 424
N.Y.S.2d 715 (1st Dep't 1980): "CPLR 305(b) was intended as a shield to protect an unwary
defendant from default judgment without proper notice, not a sword to trap a tardy or
inattentive plaintiff into dismissal." Id. at 71, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
The second change, resulting from the 1978 amendment to 305(b), eliminated the distinction between an object notice and a default notice. CPLR 305, commentary at 132 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). With the enactment of the current version of 305(b), the plaintiff
is now required to serve "nature" notice if the summons is served without a complaint. Id.
This notice must state the "nature of the action and the relief sought." Id. 305(b); see id.
305, commentary at 132. The nature notice must also contain a statement, except in medical
malpractice cases, reciting the sum of money sought, so the defendant is aware of his maximum liability in the event of default. Id. 305(b); see id. 305, commentary at 132.
See CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
3 See Nuez v. Diaz, 101 Misc. 2d 399, 401, 421 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1979); CPLR 3215(e) (1970 & Supp. 1983-1984). If the plaintiff fails to comply with
the demands of 305(b), the summons will be jurisdictionally fatal for the purposes of default
procedures, see Aversano v. Town of Brookhaven, 77 App. Div. 2d 641, 641-42, 430 N.Y.S.2d
133, 134 (2d Dep't 1980); Bal v. Court Employment Project, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d 69, 70, 424
N.Y.S.2d 715, 716 (1st Dep't 1980); Schoonmaker v. Ford Motor Co., 99 Misc. 2d 1095, 1096,
418 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1979), aff'd, 79 App. Div. 2d 1067, 435
N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep't 1981) (dictum); see also 1 WK&M 305.12, at 3-172.2 (Supp. 1983)
(interpreting Aversano, 77 App. Div. 2d 641, 430 N.Y.S.2d 133), and any default judgment
entered thereon will be void, see Nuez, 101 Misc. 2d at 401, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 771; Schoonmaker, 99 Misc. 2d at 1095, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
" Parker,61 N.Y.2d at 115-16, 460 N.E.2d at 1316, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
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plaintiff an additional 6 months within which to recommence a terminated action, unless any of three exceptions applies."' In addition to these exceptions, a judicially created prerequisite 9 necessitates that the original action be commenced by the acquisition of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.4 0 As interpreted by commentators and the courts, this prerequisite can be satisfied by the
mere service of a summons upon the defendant. 4 The service of a
summons acquires jurisdiction over the defendant4 2 and comports
with the due process requirements that the defendant receive notice of the claim against him and be afforded an opportunity to be
heard. 43 The Parker Court, it is suggested, failed to recognize that
the service of a summons without the required 305(b) notice satisfies the judicially created prerequisite to the availability of 205(a),
and should therefore avail a plaintiff of the benefits of 205(a)." 4
Steven F. Siegel
38 CPLR 205(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see supra note 6. A plaintiff may not
invoke the benefits of 205(a) if the prior action was terminated because of a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal for neglect to prosecute, or a final judgment upon the merits.
CPLR 205(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
'9 See George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 1159, 417
N.Y.S.2d 231, 234 (1979); CPLR 205, commentary at 79 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984);
SIEGEL § 52, at 54.
40 See Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 461 N.E.2d
1253, 1255, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (1984); CPLR 205, commentary at 196 (1972); SIEGEL §
52, at 54. The acquisition of subject matter jurisdiction is not considered a prerequisite to
the invocation of 205(a). See CPLR 205, commentary at 196 (1972).
41 See Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d 525, 526, 419 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1979); CPLR 3012, commentary at 125 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); SIEGEL § 52, at
54. The courts have held that the only time the prerequisite to 205(a) is not met is when
there is a complete failure to serve a summons or when the summons itself is defective. See,
e.g., Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 286, 288, 461 N.E.2d 1253,
1254-55, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767-68 (1984); George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 175,
390 N.E.2d 1156, 1159, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 234 (1979); see also CPLR 3012, commentary at
125 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (205(a) inapplicable when dismissal was for lack of personal jurisdiction); SIEGEL § 52, at 54.
42 See supra note 1 & accompanying text.
43 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950); Connell
v. Hayden, 83 App. Div. 2d 30, 35-36, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383, 389 (2d Dep't 1981); SIEGEL §§ 5859, at 59-61. The provisions that provide for service must render probable that the defendant will be apprised of the action against him and will have reasonable opportunity to
defend. 3 CARMODY-WAIT 2D § 24:1, at 652 (R. Hursh ed. 1965). If the summons is personally
delivered in New York, all due process requirements will be satisfied simultaneously. SIEGEL
§ 59, at 60.
"' "The one combination of results which would seem.., untoward would be to hold
the defect sufficiently jurisdictional to warrant a dismissal and at the same time conclude
that there is no CPLR 205(a) time in which to bring a new action." CPLR 3012, commentary at 125 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).

